The Michigan Supreme Court has ruled that the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (“WPA”) neither addresses an employee’s primary motivation, nor implies that it is even an element in establishing a WPA claim against an
employer. The decision was released yesterday in the case of Whitman v City of Burton, ___ Mich ___, ___ NW2d ___ (2013).
Whitman was the city’s Chief of Police. He filed his WPA claim against the city when the mayor declined to reappoint him. Whitman claimed that the mayor’s decision in that regard was due to Whitman’s complaints that the city’s refusal to pay him for his accumulated, unused sick & personal leave time violated a city ordinance.
The trial court ultimately ruled in Whitman’s favor. The Court of Appeals, however, reversed in a split, published opinion. Whitman v City of Burton, 293 Mich App 220; 810 NW2d 71 (2011). Importantly, the Court of Appeals decision was based upon: a) its observation that Whitman’s motivation for bring his WPA claim was
merely to advance his own financial interests; and (b) its interpretation of Shallal v Catholic Social Servs of Wayne Co, 455 Mich 604 (1997) – which it understood to require “good faith” and “a desire to inform the public on matters of public concern” to successfully maintain a WPA action. In short, the Court of Appeals found that Whitman lacked the “altruistic motive of protecting the public.”
The Michigan Supreme Court wasted no time going to the heart of the matter in its opinion. It held:
employer. The decision was released yesterday in the case of Whitman v City of Burton, ___ Mich ___, ___ NW2d ___ (2013).
Whitman was the city’s Chief of Police. He filed his WPA claim against the city when the mayor declined to reappoint him. Whitman claimed that the mayor’s decision in that regard was due to Whitman’s complaints that the city’s refusal to pay him for his accumulated, unused sick & personal leave time violated a city ordinance.
The trial court ultimately ruled in Whitman’s favor. The Court of Appeals, however, reversed in a split, published opinion. Whitman v City of Burton, 293 Mich App 220; 810 NW2d 71 (2011). Importantly, the Court of Appeals decision was based upon: a) its observation that Whitman’s motivation for bring his WPA claim was
merely to advance his own financial interests; and (b) its interpretation of Shallal v Catholic Social Servs of Wayne Co, 455 Mich 604 (1997) – which it understood to require “good faith” and “a desire to inform the public on matters of public concern” to successfully maintain a WPA action. In short, the Court of Appeals found that Whitman lacked the “altruistic motive of protecting the public.”
The Michigan Supreme Court wasted no time going to the heart of the matter in its opinion. It held:
. . . MCL 15.362 does not address an employee’s “primary motivation,” nor does the statute’s plain language suggest or imply that any motivation must be proved as a prerequisite for bringing a claim. Further, the WPA does not suggest or imply, let alone mandate, that an employee’s protected conduct must be motivated by “a desire to inform the public on matters of public concern” as a prerequisite for bringing a claim. Therefore, we hold that, with regard to the question whether an employee has engaged in conduct protected by the act, there is no “primary motivation” or “desire to inform the public” requirement contained within the WPA. Because there is no statutory basis for imposing a motivation requirement,
we will not judicially impose one. To do so would violate the fundamental rule of statutory construction that precludes judicial construction or interpretation where, as here, the statute is clear and unambiguous. [Emphasis supplied.]
The court proceeded clarify its holding in Shallal, and characterized as dicta any language that has been interpreted to require a specific motive as an element of a WPA claim. Noting that Shallal knew that she was going to be fired before she threatened to report her supervisor, it stated that, “. . . it was because Shallal’s prior knowledge of her impending termination incited her subsequent threat to report Quinn that this Court held that no reasonable juror could conclude that Shallal’s threat was causally connected to her firing.” In other words, Shallal could not establish that her protected activity caused her termination.
The Supreme Court in Whitman therefore reversed the Court of Appeals and, noting that the appellate court had not addressed the causation issue, remanded the case for resolution of whether the trial court’s denial of the city’s motion for JNOV was proper.
– Disclaimers –
The Supreme Court in Whitman therefore reversed the Court of Appeals and, noting that the appellate court had not addressed the causation issue, remanded the case for resolution of whether the trial court’s denial of the city’s motion for JNOV was proper.
– Disclaimers –
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